This paper concerns the representation of introspective belief and knowledge in multi-agent systems. An introspective agent is an agent that has the ability to refer to itself and reason about its own beliefs. It is well-known that representing introspective beliefs is theoretically very problematic. An agent which is given strong introspective abilities is most likely to have inconsistent beliefs, since it can use introspection to express self-referential beliefs that are paradoxical in the same way as the classical paradoxes of self-reference. In multi-agent systems these paradoxical beliefs can even be expressed as beliefs about the correctness and completeness of other agents' beliefs, i.e., even without the presence of explicit introspection. In this paper we explore the maximal sets of introspective beliefs that an agent can consistently obtain and retain when situated in a dynamic environment, and when treating beliefs "syntactically" (that is, formalizing beliefs as axioms of first-order predicate logic rather than using modal formalisms). We generalize some previous results by Perlis [1985] and des Rivières & Levesque [1988].
Introduction
Formal languages and theories can be used to represent and reason about agents and their beliefs about the world (including other agents and the agents themselves). A large number of different types of languages and theories have been proposed to this aim. Theories of first-order predicate logic seem particularly attractive for this purpose because of their high expressive power, and because of the extensive use of first-order logic 2 in computational systems such as the ones used in logic programming. But first-order theories have two major drawbacks:
(i) Complexity: provability in first-order logic is only semi-decidable.
The black box is on the white box.
Something agent 1 believes is not true. (ii) Inconsistency: representing introspective beliefs of agents (that is, the kind of beliefs that agents have of their own beliefs) often leads to paradoxes and inconsistency of the systems in which these beliefs are represented.
In this paper we will concentrate on ways to circumvent (ii) such that we can have consistent first-order logics of introspective beliefs-that is, we concentrate on ways to obtain consistent formalisms for introspection while still retaining the expressiveness of first-order logic. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give an informal motivating example showing how indirect introspective beliefs can lead to inconsistency. In Section 3 we introduce more formally the "syntactic approach" to belief representation, and introduce a number of general principles of belief (called epistemic principles) which we expect our agents to satisfy. In Section 4 it is shown, though, that in general we cannot make our agents satisfy these principles. More precisely, it is shown that theories containing these principles will be inconsistent. In Section 5 we consider ways of restricting the principles such that we can have consistent theories containing them. The main result in this direction is Theorem 5.9. It is shown that there does not exist consistent principles much stronger than those proven to be consistent by this theorem.
A Motivating Example
Consider the situation depicted in Figure 1 . We have here a blocks world with two agents, agent 1 (on the left) and agent 2 (on the right). We assume that the beliefs of agent 1 are given completely by the following two propositions S 1 and T 1 :
The black box is on the white box. T 1 : Everything agent 2 believes is true.
Furthermore, we assume the beliefs of agent 2 to be given completely by:
There are three boxes present. T 2 : Something agent 1 believes is not true.
The reason for agent 2 to believe that agent 1 has a false belief could e.g. be that agent 2 sees that agent 1 cannot see the dotted box (the black box is blocking the view of agent 1), and agent 2 therefore expects agent 1 to have the false belief that there are only two boxes present.
The problem with the presented two-agent situation is that it is paradoxical. It turns out that no matter whether we assume T 1 to be a true or a false proposition, we are lead to a contradiction. The argument is as follows:
Assume first that T 1 is true: then everything agent 2 believes is true, and in particular T 2 must is true. That is, something agent 1 believes is not true. But this is a contradiction, since S 1 is definitely true, and T 1 is true by assumption.
Assume now that T 1 is false: then something agent 2 believes must be false. But since S 2 is true, it must be T 2 that is false. From this it follows that every belief of agent 1 must be true. But T 1 is among agent 1's beliefs, and this proposition is assumed to be false. Again we have a contradiction.
That is, it is neither consistent to assume that T 1 is true, nor that it is false. This is a paradox. The conclusion we have to draw from this paradox is that any formal framework for reasoning about agents in which the situation in Figure 1 is possible must be inconsistent.
At first sight the example does not seem to have to do with introspection and self-reference, since the agents have no explicitly given beliefs about themselves. But introspection and self-reference is obtained indirectly: the belief T 1 of agent 1 refers to every belief of agent 2. In particular T 1 refers to T 2 , which in turn refers back to T 1 . It is this presence of indirect self-reference in the beliefs of the agents that leads to the paradox.
The argument of the paradox given above can be formalized in first-order logic, thus showing that not all beliefs can be treated consistently when formalized in first-order logic. Theorem 4.2 in Section 4 gives a number of examples of beliefs of agents that makes the first-order theory in which they are formalized inconsistent.
Based on the paradox and its formalizability in first-order logic, our main goal becomes:
to find suitable restrictions on the (indirect) introspective and self-referential beliefs such that consistency can be ensured. This is is the goal that we will pursue throughout this article.
Representing beliefs of agents as axioms of first-order predicate logic is called the syntactic approach to belief representation. In the syntactic approach, a belief is represented as a formula B i ( ϕ ) where B i is a predicate symbol, ϕ is a sentence of first-order logic (possibly containing B i ), and · is some coding scheme. By a coding scheme we understand any injective map · from the set of sentences of the language in question into the set of closed terms of that language. B i ( ϕ ) should be read as: "agent i believes that ϕ".
In the so-called semantic approach to belief representation, B i is a modal operator rather than a predicate symbol. To express that "agent i believes ϕ" we would then simply write B i ϕ. In the semantic approach no coding is needed.
The syntactic approach is preferred to the semantic one because of its expressiveness. In the syntactic approach a statement like e.g. "agent 1 has no contradictory beliefs" can be expressed by the formula ¬∃x(B 1 (x) ∧ B 1 (not(x))), assuming that we have appropriate axioms for the function not. But this statement can not be expressed in the semantic approach, since even if we have a modal logic with variables (such as first-order modal logic), the modal operator can not be applied directly to the variables-that is, B i x (or 2x) is not a well-formed modal formula and therefore neither is ¬∃x (B i x ∨ ¬B i x). The propositions T 1 and T 2 of the example above can not be expressed as sentences in a model logic either.
Through the use of axioms such as B i ( ϕ ) we can construct formal theories to represent facts of, and to reason about, multi-agent systems. Such systems could for instance be distributed computer systems, where each process is considered to be an agent. It could also be e.g. systems of autonomous robots acting in some shared environment. 
where B 1 ( on(white box, floor) ) means that agent 1 believes the white box to be on the floor, and B 2 ( ∃x(is-box(x) ∧ on(black box, x)) ) means that agent 2 believes that the black box is on some other box (but he cannot see which one, since the dotted box is blocking his view).
When having described a multi-agent system as a formal theory T , reasoning about this system and the beliefs of its agents amounts to proving theorems in T , since every theorem of T becomes a fact concerning the system.
The theory T given above is quite weak and does not allow us to deduce much about the beliefs of agent 1 and agent 2. We even cannot infer
and
since we have no axioms or inference rules allowing this. Therefore, to make such theories useful as reasoning mechanisms, we should include general epistemic principles such as e.g.
for all i and all sentences ϕ, ψ meaning that the beliefs of all agents are closed under modus ponens. Below we give a list of some of the most common such principles, translated into first-order logic from the corresponding principles in modal logic. These principles are, for all sentences ϕ, ψ in our language,
(BC1) says that agent i believes all of agent j's beliefs to be correct (true). When i = 1 and j = 2 this expresses the belief T 1 of agent 1 in the example of Section 2. (BC2) says that agent i believes agent j to believe everything that is correct (true). (O) is called the omniscience principle. This is a very strong principle saying that everything believed is true, and that everything true is believed. Agents satisfying this principle are called omniscient: they possess complete and correct knowledge of the world. (O) is recognized to be identical to Tarski's schema for truth, schema T, in first-order logic (see e.g. [12] ). We should not in general expect agents to satisfy a strong principle such as (O), but we include it among our epistemic principles anyway since, as we will see in Section 5, proving consistency results for restricted versions of (O) will automatically give us consistency results for restricted versions of all the other epistemic principles.
In many cases we might not want our epistemic principles to be instantiated with every single sentence of the language. For instance, an agent might only be omniscient with respect to some small part of the world. If this part of the world can be described through the sentences of some set M , then we could have
, and (BC2) M are defined similarly to be the set of instances of the respective epistemic principles over M . Definition 3.2 Let M be a set of sentences of some first-order language L. By an epistemic theory over M we understand any combination of
that is, any combination of the epistemic principles given above with ϕ and ψ instantiated over M .
The Problem of Obtaining Consistency
We can think of the epistemic principles as something being added to a base theory. By a base theory we understand any theory T in L satisfying:
for some ψ not containing any of the B i 's.
These two characterizing properties can be paraphrased as:
(i') There are no meta-beliefs (beliefs about beliefs) in T .
(ii') Everything believed by an agent in T is true (in T ).
The theory considered in Example 3.1 is a base theory. A base theory describes the environment in which the agents are situated as well as the agents' firstorder beliefs about this environment. Condition (ii) simply says that all (firstorder) beliefs about the environment are correct. Agents might of course in some situations have false beliefs, but we do not consider such beliefs as part of the base theory.
When we construct a theory T for reasoning about a multi-agent system, our choice of epistemic principles should not depend on our choice of base theory. For one thing, the epistemic principles only give general properties of belief (or knowledge), and our choice of these should only depend on what kind of "modality" (or propositional attitude) B i is supposed to capture. Another thing is that in a changing environment the base theory might change over time to reflect these changes in the environment, but this should not affect the epistemic principles and their validity. But, surprisingly, it turns out that whether a theory including a set of epistemic principles is consistent or not depends crucially on the chosen base theory. To see this, let us first introduce the notion of universal consistency.
Definition 4.1 An epistemic theory E is called universally consistent if, for any consistent base theory B, the theory B ∪ E is consistent.
All epistemic theories used to reason about agents should of course be universally consistent: if not, we could end up in that very peculiar situation that our theory could suddenly become inconsistent just from updating some axioms of the base theory. But: (
Proof. Trivially, when a theory is not universally consistent, neither is any extension of it. We therefore only need to prove that none of (1)- (4) is universally consistent. That (1) and (2) are not universally consistent is a direct consequence of a theorem of Montague in [7] . That (3) is not universally consistent is a direct consequence of a theorem of Thomason in [13] . Both these theorems are reviewed in [3] and [8] . Finally, that (4) is not universally consistent is proved in Section 5.3.
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The fact that (1) is not universally consistent is probably not a serious problem, since (R2) is a very strong principle that beliefs of agents would not be likely to satisfy (at least not in the syntactic treatment). We might also in many cases take (2) to be too strong, since (A3) excludes the possibility of an agent having a false belief (though, in other cases, when reasoning about agents, it seems appropriate to assume that the agents will never believe anything that is not true). But, as we see from (3) and (4), even if (R2) and (A3) are excluded, we can still get an epistemic theory which is not universally consistent.
The theorem shows, as also suggested by the example of Section 2, that assuming agents to have certain seemingly natural beliefs and assuming their beliefs to satisfy certain seemingly natural principles can make the entire reasoning framework in which these beliefs are represented inconsistent.
Based on this negative result our main problem now becomes: to find sets of sentences M with which we can safely instantiate our epistemic theories, that is, to find sets M ⊆ L for which the epistemic theories over M are universally consistent. This problem is the subject of the following section.
Some Universally Consistent Epistemic Theories
In this section we let L denote a fixed first-order language. We assume that L contains a number of unary predicate symbols B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n (n > 0). In the following we will, for simplicity, only concentrate on finding sets M ⊆ L for which (O) M is universally consistent. We can do this without loss of generality, for, as the following lemma shows, if (O) M is universally consistent then so is any other epistemic theory over M .
If the omniscience principle over M , (O) M , is universally consistent, then every epistemic theory over M is universally consistent.
Proof. Assume M satisfies the requirement, and that (O) M is universally consistent. Let B be an arbitrary consistent base theory. We have to show that then
is also consistent. Since we know (O) M to be universally consistent, B ∪(O) M must be consistent. If we therefore can prove that
then C must be consistent as well, and this will conclude the proof. We only prove 
4. B i ( ϕ ) ↔ ¬B i ( ¬ϕ ) by 1. and 3.
B
showing that the ϕ-instance of (D),
The above lemma tells us that if we know (O) M to be universally consistent then any epistemic theory can safely be instantiated with each of the sentences of M .
Well-founded Epistemic Theories
Our first universal consistency result is a slightly generalized version of a result of des Rivières & Levesque [3] . We start out with a couple of new definitions. A coding scheme · is said to be well-founded if there is no infinite sequence of sentences ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , . . . such that for all i ∈ N, ϕ i contains ϕ i+1 as a term. In the following we will assume all considered coding schemes to be well-founded.
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Definition 5.2 Let ϕ, ψ be formulas of L. We say that ϕ is contained in ψ if one of the following is the case (i) ϕ is a sub-formula of ψ (ii) there is a sub-formula B i ( γ ) of ψ such that ϕ is contained in γ.
Note, that "contained in" above is defined recursively, and the definition only makes sense when the coding scheme is well-founded. By our definition, if ϕ and ψ are formulas and A is a one-place predicate symbol different from all the B i 's, then ϕ is contained in e.g. both ϕ ∧ ψ and
The following theorem tells us that we can always safely instantiate our epistemic theories with sentences such as ¬on(black box, floor) ) ) 6 It can easily be seen that in any first-order language containing infinitely many ground terms it is possible to construct a well-founded coding scheme. Furthermore, any "standard" Gödel coding will obviously be well-founded.
in which we have nested beliefs, but not necessarily with sentences such as
in which we have quantified beliefs. Example 5. 4 The theorem shows that consistency is ensured if we refrain from expressing quantified beliefs. In the example of Section 2 both T 1 and T 2 are quantified beliefs, quantifying over the beliefs of agent 2 and agent 1, respectively. The theorem tells us that we would not be able to derive a paradox if the agents had no such quantified beliefs. Without quantified beliefs we can always reason about multi-agent systems consistently.
We will prove the theorem by another method than that of des Rivières & Levesque, who used a careful translation from a modal logic to prove their result. The important thing about our method is that it can be considered as a general method for proving these kinds of universal consistency results.
For every set M ⊆ L we define a functional
The first three conditions above are recognized to correspond to Kleene's weak three-valued logic with ⊥ as the third value. The fourth condition will ensure that in any fixed point
By an initial extension of F we understand any functional G that extends 10 F and satisfies
Now we can state an important lemma: 
A simple induction proof on the syntactic complexity of ϕ now shows that for all ϕ ∈ L we have
This is proved using the definition of H and the first three defining conditions of We now define the notion of a semantic graph. For any functional F , we define the semantic graph of F as the directed graph (L, → F ) with nodes L, and edge relation → F given by
One way of expressing the condition on the right-hand side is that "the truthvalue of ψ is needed to determine the truth-value of ϕ". In this sense, the semantic graph is a graph of semantical dependency: there is an edge from ψ to ϕ iff ϕ depends semantically on ψ. We leave out the proof of this lemma. It is proven by considering the defining conditions of F L and by using that · is a well-founded coding scheme. Now Lemma 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 together immediately give us a proof of Theorem 5.3:
Lemma 5.5 it is sufficient to prove that every initial extension of F M has a total fixed point. But, by Lemma 5.7, the semantical graph of F M is wellfounded, and therefore Lemma 5.6 immediately gives the required result. 2
Positive Epistemic Theories
In the following we assume that the only propositional connectives used in first-order formulas are ∧, ∨, and ¬ (i.e. not using → or ↔).
The machinery we have introduced above also immediately gives a proof of the following theorem, which follows from a result proven independently by Perlis in [9] and Fefermann in [4] .
Theorem 5.8 (After Perlis [9] and Fefermann [4] ) The theory 
is monotone with respect to the ordering on {t, f } given by f < t. Thus G has a total fixed point, and this will be a fixed point of F M as well. 2
Stronger Epistemic Theories
¿From the proof given for Theorem 5.8 above, we see that we have actually proven something even stronger: Let M = {ϕ ∈ L | no B i (x) occurs in the scope of ¬ in ϕ}. It can easily be seen that M is very close to being a maximal set of sentences with which any epistemic principle can safely be instantiated. Actually, even a sentence such as ∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬B i (x)), which is one of the simplest sentences not in M , is not safe to instantiate with:
Proof. Let L be a first-order language with equality and let · be any coding scheme in L. Let ϕ = ∀x (A(x) ∨ ¬B i (x)) and let M = {ϕ}. We then have (4) is not universally consistent.
Conclusion
As argued in e.g. [2, 8, 9, 10] representing beliefs of agents should be done syntactically through predicates of first-order logic to ensure sufficient expressivity. Unfortunately it turns out that representing beliefs syntactically easily leads to inconsistency of the representing system [7, 8, 13] . This calls for work in finding consistent ways to treat beliefs syntactically, that is, to find restricted ways of representing beliefs in first-order logic such that consistency will necessarily be retained. Some of the most important previous results in this direction can be found in [3, 8, 9] . In this article we have reached a result which generalizes both [9] and [3] . This result shows that as long as we refrain from expressing quantified negated beliefs (as e.g. in ∀x (B 1 (x) → ¬B 2 (x))) consistency is always ensured. Our result generalizes [9] by allowing negated beliefs (in [9] negated beliefs like ¬B 1 ( ϕ ) will be treated non-classically), and generalizes [3] by allowing quantified beliefs ( [3] does not allow quantified beliefs like ∀x (B 1 (x) ∨ B 2 (x))).
